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The Wagner Seed Saga: Is There Any Great
Cercla Route That Potentially Responsible
Parties Can Chart Between the Devil
and the Deep Blue Sea?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 1 the D.C. Circuit sustained
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) denial of reimbursement to Wagner Seed Co. (Wagner) for its costs of cleaning up a chemical spill at Wagner's warehouse, even though
Wagner proved a valid "act of God" defense. The court so held,
even though 1) the EPA had ordered the cleanup under threat
of severe sanctions and had successfully argued that Wagner
would not suffer any "non-compensable harm" if it complied
and were found not liable later, 2) the Second Circuit had denied any pre-enforcement review of the EPA order on the basis
that Wagner could have an adequate post hoc judicial review of
its liability, and 3) the EPA later did not find Wagner liable for
the spill which resulted from an "act of God," a lightning strike
that caused the conflagration of the warehouse. 2
The EPA argued both sides of the facts. First, the EPA
claimed in the Second Circuit that Wagner was not entitled to
an injunction since it would not suffer "non-compensable harm"
if not liable by virtue of a valid defense. 3 That is, Wagner
could petition for reimbursement from the EPA if no other
Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) existed from whom to seek
contribution. 4
Second, the EPA, in the D.C. Circuit, claimed that Wagner
was not entitled to reimbursement since it had completed most
of its cleanup prior to enactment of the Superfund Amend-

1.
946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Wagner III].
2.
Id.
3.
Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter
Wagner I]. Between Wagner I and Wagner Ill, came Wagner Seed Co., Inc. v.
Bush, 709 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D. D.C. 1989) [hereinafter Wagner II] wherein
Wagner Seed unsuccessfully petitioned and then sued EPA for the costs of cleanup resulting from Wagner's compliance with the order litigated in Wagner I.
Wagner III is the appeal of Wagner II, thus completing a "Wagner Trilogy."
4.
Wagner, 800 F.2d at 314.
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ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)5 proVISIOns
setting forth the reimbursement scheme. 6 The EPA interpreted
the language of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) section
106(b)(2)(A), 7 to preclude reimbursement to Wagner. The court
agreed.
Wagner did not advance judicial estoppel or equitable estoppel to preclude the EPA from changing its previous assertion that a remedy was available. Wagner failed to invoke
CERCLA section 112, 8 which provided a remedy prior to section 106. Wagner brought its claim under section 106, rather
than under section 112. 9 Wagner could have asserted that if it
was time-barred from the procedures of the new statutory enactment, then it was certainly entitled to relief under the preexisting procedures. Finally, the opinion never mentions estoppel issues which could have been raised by the court or by
Wagner and should have been determinative. 10
This paper discusses the effect of the courts' failure to
consider judicial or equitable estoppel in holding the EPA to its
original arguments in which it prevailed against Wagner. Section II lays out the facts, procedure and reasoning beginning in
Wagner 111 and concluding with Wagner 111. 12 Section III explores the provisions of CERCLA on which the courts relied in
this ''Wagner Trilogy," 13 as well as the judicial estoppel doctrine on which no one relied. Section IV points out some possible flaws in the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Wagner III, which
should have changed the result. Section V provides suggested
approaches that the courts, Potentially Responsible Parties
(PRP) and the EPA should take to prevent such inequities in
future actions, not just as pertaining to section 106 orders, but
5.
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) [hereinafter
SARA].
6.
Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 924.
7.
See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, § 106(b)(2)(A), Pub. L. 99-499, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1988)
[hereinafter CERCLA].
8.
ld. § 112(b), 42 u.s.c. § 9612(b).
9.
Wagner Ill at 920.
ld.; see Mark J. Plumer, Note, Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a
10.
Judicial Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409 (1987); lB JEREMY C. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 'JI 0.405 [8] (1991).
11.
800 F.2d 310.
12.
946 F.2d 918.
See supra note 3.
13.
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as a general proposition.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
To appreciate fully the court's ruling in Wagner 11114 one
must understand the long drama which occurred as Wagner
sought equity amid a maze of regulatory and judicial limitations. Wagner vainly attempted pre-enforcement judicial review
of an EPA administrative order, was rebuffed in its constitutional challenges as the courts found that due process after the
fact would remedy all injustices, and then watched its promised
remedy disappear as the most recent court apparently forgot or
ignored the previous arguments and assurances of the EPA and
the courts.

A. Wagner I in the EPA
Wagner Seed Company distributed animal feed and agricultural chemicals to nurseries and municipalities from its
inventory in a warehouse on Long Island. 15 On June 1, 1985,
Wagner's warehouse burned to the ground in a fire caused by a
lightning strike. 16 Despite Wagner's efforts at control, under
the guidance of hired experts, chemicals escaped to surrounding properties with the runoff produced as firefighters used
water to fight the flamesY Wagner immediately commenced
a cleanup, supervised by the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (DEC). 18 The EPA disputed the
effectiveness of the cleanup, and when meetings between the
EPA and Wagner proved unsatisfactory to the EPA, it issued
an administrative order under CERCLA Section 106, 19 requiring prompt remedial actions, with eventual complete elimination of the contamination. 20 A $5000 daily fine for noncompliance was threatened, 21 with treble damages if government

14.
Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 920.
15.
Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 313.
16. !d.
17. ld.
18. ld.
19.
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988).
20.
CERCLA § l06(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) permits such orders upon a finding
"that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public
health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release
of a hazardous substance." !d.
21.
CERCLA § 106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b).
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resources had to be used to clean up the site. 22

B. Wagner I in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, Wagner moved for a preliminary injq.nction to
stop the EPA from enforcing its section 106 administrative
order or imposing sanctions. 23 The EPA successfully argued
that Wagner's remedy was to seek reimbursement after the
cleanup, not judicial review prior to the cleanup. The EPA
prevailed, arguing that Wagner would not suffer any "non-compensable harm."24 The district court agreed that no unconstitutional taking would occur, since due process would be satisfied.25

C.

Wagner I in the Second Circuit

The Second Circuit determined that it and the district
court lacked jurisdiction to conduct any pre-enforcement judicial review as to Wagner's "act of God" defense. 26 The court
did consider the merits of Wagner's constitutional arguments
that such a severe penalty without pre-enforcement review
violated "due process." The court held the arguments unavailing, saying that a good faith defense must be read into the
statute. 27
The court sustained the statute by giving it a constitutional reading in an Ex Parte Young analysis. 28 The statute would
have been an unconstitutional burden, inhibiting a party from
appealing any order absent some scheme to provide opportunity
for testing the order without incurring debilitating or confiscatory penalties. 29 Wagner would thus not be liable for punitive
damages or fines if a reviewing court found it to "appear and in

22.
CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3).
Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 312.
23.
ld. at 314.
24.
25.
ld. at 312-313.
26.
ld. at 315.
ld. at 316.
27.
28.
ld. at 316 (interpreting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (a penalty is
unconstitutional if it is so severe that it intimidates a party from testing its
validity in court); since a court must give a statute a constitutional reading if
possible, a good faith defense must be read in to avoid unconstitutionality here).
ld. at 314 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d
29.
1115, 1119 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 426 U.S. 911 (1976)).
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good faith interpose defenses as a basis for noncompliance."30
With unwarranted brevity, the court dispensed with the
"unconstitutional taking" argument that later became the issue
in Wagner II and Wagner III. 31 Wagner had expressed doubt
that it could secure reimbursement from the EPA even if it successfully proved that it was not a responsible party. 32 The
court referred back to the availability of the "good faith defense" as protection against imposition of a fine or other penalty.33 The court, siding with the EPA, stated that post-enforcement judicial review would prevent any taking in violation of
"due process."34 Until that time, Wagner could comply, and
petition for reimbursement later. Alternatively, Wagner could
refuse, relying on its "good faith defense" to strike down, in
some future litigation, any accrued penalties. 35 Wagner complied in the face of the penalties.

D. Wagner II in the EPA
Upon ninety eight percent completion of the cleanup to the
EPA's satisfaction, Wagner petitioned the EPA for reimbursement of costs under the amended provisions of CERCLA section
106(b)(2) which had been passed during the cleanup. 36 The
EPA denied the petition, interpreting the statute as precluding
reimbursement of any cleanup activity begun prior to the passage of the act. 37 While Wagner's "act of God" defense could
relieve Wagner of any liability for the release or costs of cleanup, the EPA said that reimbursement did not apply to a company that had completed a substantial amount of cleanup before
the 1986 enactment38 of the statute. 39

30.
Id. at 316 (quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 447 n.6 (1964)).
Id. at 317.
31.
32.
Id.; see also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 606 F. Supp.
412, 416; (D. Minn. 1985) Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 739
(D. Kan. 1985); Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A., 599 F. Supp. 69, 73-74 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(indicating concern that reimbursement might not be available).
33.
Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 312, 317.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Wagner II, 709 F. Supp. at 250.
37.
Id.
38.
SARA § 613, 42 U.S.C. § 113 (1988).
39.
Wagner II, 709 F. Supp. at 252-53.

406

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 6

E. Wagner II in the District Court
for the District of Columbia
Following the EPA's denial of the petition for reimbursement, Wagner sued in the District of Columbia.40 That
court held that the EPA made a reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statuteY Deferring to the EPA, it held that the
EPA had reasonably found the statute to be inapplicable to
Wagner since Wagner had agreed to engage in cleanup prior to
passage of the Act. 42
The EPA changed its argument from Wagner I, where the
court found Wagner's fear of "no reimbursement" unconvincing,
despite Wagner's concern over the EPA reluctance to reimburse
expenses as expressed in Aminoil, Inc. v. E.P.A. 43

F. Wagner III in the District of Columbia Circuit
In Wagner III, the D.C. Circuit sustained the district
court's ruling in favor of the EPA's denial of reimbursement to
Wagner, notwithstanding that the EPA did not dispute
Wagner's "act of God" defense, thereby relieving Wagner of all
liability.
Judge Ginsburg held that the EPA was the administering
agency of CERCLA, and that the court owed deference to the
EPA's interpretation of the statute if it was a "permissible
interpretation" of the language. 44 The court then held that the
EPA's interpretation of the reimbursement provision, that the
SARA amendment did not apply to any party which received a
cleanup order prior to enactment of SARA in 1986, was reasonable.45
In his dissent, Judge Williams argued that the EPA was
not "the administrative agency" charged with administration of
CERCLA, so deference was misplaced. Therefore, the interpretation issue should not have been so summarily dismissed. 46
40.
ld.
41.
ld. at 252-53.
42.
ld.; see also CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(b)(2) (1988).
43.
599 F. Supp. 69, 73-74 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (describing methods EPA may use
to pursue an action); See Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 314; see also United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 606 F. Supp. 412, 416; (D. Minn. 1985); Wagner
Elec. Corp. v. Thomas, 612 F. Supp. 736, 739 (D. Kan. 1985).
44.
Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
45.
ld. at 922-23
46.
ld. at 925-26 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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Estoppel arguments were not discussed in the opinion. Wagner
did not raise them, nor did the court do so "sua sponte."47
Ill.

BACKGROUND OF PERTINENT CERCLA PROVISIONS

CERCLA was passed and funded in 1980.48 In 1986, Congress passed SARA. 49 Cleanups are funded by individual parties responsible for the hazardous wastes disposed of, or by, the
EPA from the Hazardous Substances Superfund 50 or
"Superfund."51
Funding comes from general tax revenues, taxes on generators and manufacturers of hazardous chemicals, and from recovery actions against parties responsible for releases of hazardous wastes. 52 The EPA can issue administrative orders
under CERCLA to a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) to
conduct a cleanup. 53 The EPA can assess penalties for noncompliance or willful violations of the order. 54
A. THE STATUTE: Key Provisions Regulating the EP4 and

Potentially Responsible Parties under CERCLA Section 106 and
Related Sections
Section 106 has several provisions of interest. These provisions include penalties, authority and administration, access to
judicial review, and reimbursement schemes for parties ordered
to clean up but later found not liable.

1. Penalty Provisions
The penalties for non-compliance with CERCLA are central
to the instant case. The penalty provisions state that any per-

47.
ld. at 919-920, 925.
48.
CERCLA § 101-175, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988).
49.
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1614 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675
(1988)). The amendment included mandatory cleanup schedules and detailed
cleanup standards, and provided additional funds and authority to regulate
Superfund sites. ld.
50.
See CERCLA § 101(11), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11) (1988); see also id. § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (definitions under CERCLA).
51.
ld. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
52.
ld. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
53.
ld. § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
54.
ld. §§ 107(a) and(c). A detailed discussion of these provisions is provided
by Richard H. Mays, but provisions key to Wagner III are summarized here. See generally Richard H. Mays, Who's Afraid Of CERCLA § 106 Administrative Orders?,
19 ENV'T REP. CURR. DEV.(BNA) 1926 (1989).
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son who, without sufficient cause, willfully violates, or fails or
refuses to comply with a section 106 administrative order may
be fined not more than $25,000 per day of violation. 5 5 Similarly,
if a person who is liable for a release or threat of a hazardous
substance fails without sufficient cause to properly provide
removal or remedial action pursuant to a section 106 administrative order, such person may be liable to the United States
for punitive damages in an amount at least equal to, and not
more than, three times the amount of any costs incurred by
the fund as a result of such failure to take proper action. 56

A Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) at a superfund site
must therefore respond carefully to such an order. 57 Conceivably, other future EPA policies may have similar review and
sanction provisions and analogous EPA arguments before the
courts.

2. Authority and Administration
CERCLA provides in relevant part:
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or
welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United States to secure
such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or
threat . . . . The President may also . . . take other action
under this section, including, but not limited to, issuing such
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environment. 58

The President's authority is actually redelegated to the EPA,
the judiciary, and agencies such as the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the United States Department of
Defense (DOD). 59

55.
CERCLA § 106(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (1988).
ld. § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3).
56.
57.
See, e.g., id. § 113(k)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(d)(2)(D) (parties which may
be liable for costs of cleanup, by virtue of their responsibility for creating, disposing, etc. of the "released" hazardous material).
58.
ld. § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
59.
Some authority under § 106 has been redelegated, to the Administrator of
the EPA by Executive Order No. 12580, § 4(d)(1) (Jan. 25, 1987). Nevertheless,
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3. Judicial Review
Also central to Wagner I and Wagner III was the lack of preenforcement review of a section 106 order in any U.S. district
court, regardless of any justification for refusal to comply. 60
CERCLA precludes federal court jurisdiction to review any
order issued under section 106, except for EPA-initiated enforcement actions such as a recovery action for response costs,
damages, or contribution, an enforcement action, or an action
to compel remedial activities. 61 However, the EPA could take
years to complete cleanup, and litigate liability before any judicial review of the order occurs. The potential devastation of
penalties compounding during all those years was no doubt a
driving force in Wagner's decision to comply first and litigate
later. 62

4. Provisions for Reimbursement
SARA63 added section 106(b)(2), authorizing a simpler and
more specific mechanism for a PRP to petition the EPA for
reimbursement of costs of completed cleanup. 64 Under SARA,
a PRP must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it is
not liable for those costs. 65 Otherwise, it must demonstrate on
the administrative record that the EPA's proposed response
was "arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."66 This is not the only interpretation of the statute,67
which is fact dependent, but it may be the most widely accepted.ss
It is critical to this case that until the 1986 enactment of
SARA, the procedure for claiming against Superfund was in
section 112.69 SARA merely provided a simpler procedure for
the Federal Judiciary has a leading role, as do other agencies such as the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense. CERCLA §§ 106(a), 120, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9620 (1988).
60.
See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988).
61.
!d.
62.
See Wagner I, 800 F.2d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
63.
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9613
(1988)).
64.
CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2).
65.
!d. § 106(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C).
66.
!d. § 106(b)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(D).
67.
See Wagner III, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., dissenting).
68.
See, e.g., Mays, supra note 54, at 1927.
69.
See CERCLA § 112, 94 Stat. 2792-95, (codified as amended by SARA, §§
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those under section 106 administrative orders, including a civil
action, with a lower "preponderance of the evidence" standard
of proof. 70

B. On "the Horns of a Dilemma" "Between the Devil and the
Deep Blue Sea"71
Like the court's metaphors, mixed above, the litany of
provisions relating to section 106 orders demonstrates the potential difficulty for a PRP that believes itself to have a meritorious defense to liability. 72 Punitive damages are discretionary
with a reviewing court, up to triple the cost to the Fund. 73
Likewise, fines up to $25,000 per day of willful violation give a
PRP pause. 74 Thus, if the EPA orders an improper remedial
action, a PRP comes face to face with debilitating penalties and
treble damages. These costs accrue from the deadline for compliance, specified in the order, until after judicial review of the
order and the PRP's defenses, years later.

C. Making A Good Faith Argument For
the "Good Faith Defense"
One key to a PRP's "compliance decision" under an order is
the "sufficient cause" language of the penalty provisions. 75 The
meaning of "sufficient cause," according to Senator Robert
Stafford, sponsor of the legislation, should
encompass defenses ... that the person who was the subject
of the order was not the party responsible under the act for
the release of the hazardous substance. It would certainly be
unfair to assess punitive damages against a party who for
good reason believed himself not to be the responsible party.
For example, if there were, at the time of the order, substantial facts in question, or if the party subject to the order was
not a substantial contributor to the release or threatened
release, punitive damages should either not be assessed or
should be reduced in the interest of equity.

l09(a)(3), 112, 100 Stat. 1633, 1646-47, at 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (1988)) (laying out a
reimbursement claims procedure).
70.
Id. § 106 (b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C)
Wagner I, 800 F.2d 311, 312 (2d Cir. 1986).
71.
72.
See CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988).
Id.
73.
74.
Id. § 106(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1).
75.
Id.; § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3).
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We also intend that the [EPA's] orders ... must have been
valid. In particular, ... not be inconsistent with the national
contingency plan. [We] expect the courts to examine ... orders or expenditures ... given the standards of the act and of
the national contingency plan. If the orders or expenditures
were not proper, then certainly no punitive damages should
be assessed or they should be proportionate to the demands of
equity. 76

Several defenses that might be "sufficient cause" are treated in the literature and cases, but are not pertinent here. 77
Invalidity of the order, on the other hand could arguably apply
to Wagner, as it includes a failure to follow prescribed procedures78 or to comply with standards set forth in the statute or
in the National Contingency Plan. 79 Moreover, the remedy
selected by the EPA must be the most cost-effective80 and
could be subject to attack on those grounds. 81

Judicial Estoppel: Powerful, but Distinct from Equitable
Estoppel and Collateral Estoppel
Judicial estoppel82 is a doctrine forbidding inconsistent
positions, usually as to facts, which operates independently of
equitable estoppel. 83 Judicial estoppel is also distinct from collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an
issue that has been actually litigated and was essential to the
judgment. 84 Equitable estoppel precludes a change of position
by an opposing party if one has detrimentally relied on the

D.

76.
126 CONG. REC. at 30986 (Nov. 24, 1980) (emphasis added).
77.
See, e.g., Randy M. Mott, Surviving the Superfund Nuclear Weapon: Defense of Administrative Orders, COPING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION: A SATELLITE PROGRAM (1989);
Mays, supra, note 54.
78.
However, an error in remedial action selected must be so central that the
action would have been significantly changed absent such error. See SARA §
1130)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(4)) (1988).
79.
See 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1991).
80.
See CERCLA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.68
(1991) (National Contingency Plan).
81.
See, e.g., Colorado v. ldarado Mining Co., 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Colo.
1989).
82.
See Plumer, supra note 10; MOORE, supra, note 10 at «JJ 0.405[8].
83.
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1178 (D. S.C.
1975).
84.
Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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opposition's earlier position on which it prevailed. 85 By contrast, in certain circumstances a party may be precluded as a
matter of law from adopting a legal position in conflict with one
earlier taken in the same or related litigation. 86 Though not
confined to situations where the party asserting the earlier
contrary position prevailed there, it is considered more appropriate in that situation. 87
Thus, judicial estoppel operates regardless of whether the
prior inconsistent position was successfully maintained and
irrespective of reliance by, or prejudice to, the party invoking
it. 88 So, likewise, strangers, as well as parties to the proceeding in which the prior inconsistent position was taken, may
take advantage of the preclusion. 89 The requirement that the
position be successfully asserted simply means that a party
must have been successful in getting some earlier court to
accept the position. 90
The rationale for the rule is that "it is sufficiently important to the integrity of the federal courts that their processes
not be lent to this plain example of 'intentional self-contradiction . . . as a means of obtaining unfair advantage."'91 The
general considerations of the orderly administration of justice
and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings justify the
rule. 92 Courts hold that use of inconsistent positions would
flagrantly exemplify that playing "fast and loose with the
courts" which has been recognized as an evil that the courts
should not tolerate. 93
Thus, judicial estoppel protects interests different from
those protected by equitable estoppel. 94 Equitable estoppel is
designed to protect any adversary who may be prejudiced by
the attempted change of position. 95 On the other hand, judi-

85.
Scarano v.Central New Jersey Ry., 203 F.2d 510, 512-513 (3d Cir. 1953)
86.
Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1982).
87.
ld.; see also United States v. Webber, 396 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968).
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D. S.C. 1975).
88.
89.
ld.
90.
Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982).
91.
ld. at 1167-1168; see also Scarano v. Central New Jersey Ry., 203 F.2d
510, 513 (3d Cir. 1953).
92.
Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984)
(quoting 1B JEREMY C. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 'lJ .405[8) at 767 (1991)).
93.
ld.
94.
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177 (D.S.C.
1975).
ld.
95.
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cial estoppel, or preclusion against inconsistent positions, is
designed to protect the integrity of the courts and the judicial
process. 96 Its purpose is to prevent
a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society . . . . [T]he public welfare demands that the agencies of
public justice be not so impotent that they must always be
mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud. 97

The effect of judicial estoppel is to bar advancement of
truly inconsistent positions. 98 A party who has obtained relief
from an adversary by asserting and offering proof to support
one position may not be heard later to contradict himself in an
effort to establish against the same adversary a second claim
inconsistent with his earlier contention. 99 There is no unfairness nor conflict in the rule since it is not a denial of pleading
in the alternative. 100 Some courts have actually extended the
rule, where identity of parties and a single transaction encompass two separate actions, to bind a party making any allegation to that allegation in both causes of action. 101
The importance of judicial estoppel in the instant case is
that the Wagner III court states that the EPA had applied its
interpretation of the law consistently. 102 That ignores, however, the totally inconsistent approach of the EPA during Wagner
I, where the EPA argued that PRPs had a reimbursement remedy if not liable for a release which they cleaned up, and thus
would suffer no "non-compensable harm." 103
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE

Wagner III COURT'S REASONING

The Wagner III court, was deferential, arguably to the
point of abdication. In dissent, Judge Williams pointed out that
the EPA is not "the agency" charged with administration of
CERCLA, so deference is misplaced, and thus the interpreta-

96.
!d.
97.
!d. at 1179.
98.
Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984).
99.
!d.
100.
!d. at 1215; see also FED. R. Crv. P. 8(e)(2).
101.
In re Double D Dredging Co., 467 F.2d 468,469 (5th Cir. 1972).
102.
Wagner III, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing 918 F.2d 1323 (7th
Cir. 1990)).
103.
Wagner I, 800 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986).
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tion issue should not have been so summarily dismissed. 104
Had the court focused on interpretation, Wagner might have
won on the merits; however, estoppel arguments should have
precluded the EPA's interpretation entirely.

The EPA Is Not Necessarily the Delegated Agency to Administer CERCLA

A.

Various agencies and courts are given responsibilities in
CERCLA. Since the EPA is not the "administering agency" of
CERCLA section 106(b)(2), it is entitled to no deference in
interpretation. 105 This fact is critical since the standard of
review can determine the outcome here. The court cited the
statute giving the EPA authority to pay claims to avoid suits as
if it were sufficient to make the EPA the administering agency.106 It then cited the Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 107 rule that "when a court is
presented with an interpretation of a statute by an agency that
administers it, and the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, then the court must defer to that
interpretation if it is reasonable." 108 The court's entire analysis hangs on this assignment. 109
The EPA is clearly neither the delegated agency to interpret nor to administer all of CERCLA. 110 How much of the
statute must the EPA administer in order to have interpretive
omnipotence? Chevron indicates deference as to a specific sec-

Wagner III, at 925-926 (Williams, J., dissenting).
See CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606{b)(2) (1988).
See Exec. Order No. 12480, § 4(d)(l), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. foll. § 9615;
see also CERCLA § 106(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1988); Wagner Ill, 946

104.
105.
106.

F.2d at 920 (citing Eagle Picher-Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 909 n.9, 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) as the only precedent for this proposition).
107.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
108.
Wagner III, 946 F.2d at 920.
109.
Under CERCLA § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (1988), any "person who
receives and complies" with an abatement order under § 106(a) may petition the
President for reimbursement. The court identified this as the key issue. The EPA
has been delegated the authority to settle such cases if possible, but a complainant must sue the President if denied. Wagner III at 921. Here the EPA was
interpreted to be the delegee of the President's authority, and then given such
deference in its interpretation as arguably to nullify any appeal of that interpretation. Id. at 921-923. Had the court instead sent Wagner back to a procedure
under § 112, the issue should have gone to arbitration, as discussed below.
110.
See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429, 434 (1st Cir. 1990)
(refusing to give the EPA interpretation of remedies any deference); see also
Wagner Ill 946 F.2d 918 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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tion for which an agency is responsible. 111 The EPA had authority to interpret the meaning of "receives and complies" in
section 106(b)(2) as the President's agent to pay rather than litigate.112 However, under section 106(b)(l) and 106(b)(2)(B),
the courts enforce rights of all parties, so the EPA deserves no
deference where it merely acts as the President's "prosecutor."113
This concept is not unique. 114 Certainly in administering
its own affairs, an agency like the EPA makes operational
interpretations of many statutes for which it is not responsible.115 The EPA could not assay to claim that such an interpretation is binding on the IRS, for example, the agency responsible for administering the tax code. One is hard pressed to

111.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference only for agency's construction
of a statute which it administers); see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S.
638 (1990). The Court unanimously refused to defer to the Department of Labor
on a federal private right of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1801-72 (1988). The Secretary of Labor administered the act generally, and set safety standards under 29
U.S.C. § 1841(b)(2) (1988) and made rules under § 1861, but under § 1854, the
Court stopped. It stated that "Congress has expressly established the Judiciary
and not the Department of Labor as the adjudicator of private rights of action
arising under the statute," so the agency could not "bootstrap" its § 1841 authority over standards into an area in which it had "no jurisdiction." Adams Fruit, 494
U.S. at 647.
112.
CERCLA § l06(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A) (1988). A non-liable PRP
can petition the President for reimbursement after it "receives and complies with
the terms of any order." ld.
113.
In Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), the Secretary of Agriculture was
held to have no administrative oversight over § 1854 rights of action in the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, only power to set safety
standards under 29 U.S.C. § 1841(b)(2). See also United States v. Western Electric
Co., 900 F.2d 283, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (no deference to agency acting in "prosecutorial role").
114.
See Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d 918 (Williams, J., dissenting); see also Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990) (Secretary of Agriculture has no administrative oversight over § 1854 rights); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc.,
900 F.2d 429, 434 (1st Cir. 1990) (refusing to give the EPA interpretation of
remedies any deference); see, e.g. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24,
26-27 (1st Cir. 1990) (definition of "owner or operator" in CERCLA § 107(a));
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554-60 (11th Cir. 1990)
("owner/operator" as well as "secured creditor exemption"); United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirmative defense defmition
under § 107(b)(3) and waste generator's responsibility under § 107(a)(3)); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th
Cir. 1986) (individual liability under § 107(a)(3)). Even in Wagner I, a good faith
defense against the EPA's threatened fines and penalties was reviewed de novo.
Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 316.
115.
For example, the EPA may make operational interpretations of Title 26 of
the U.S. Code which deals with taxation.
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distinguish the court's actions in the instant case from such a
situation, however. Absent language giving the EPA administrative authority, it had none over CERCLA administration in
general. At least, the EPA had no more than the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE) or any agency assigned enforcement and administration of other CERCLA
sections. 116

The Court Improperly Focused on the Process
of Section 106(b)(2), Rather Than Wagner's
Right to a Remedy Under Section 112

B.

Properly viewed, Section 106(b)(2) simply provides a new
procedural means for reimbursement from the Superfund. Congress provided the original Section lll(a)(2) for any claim for
response costs required of non-government persons and approved by the responsible federal official. 117
Section 106(b)(2) simply added an alternative procedure
and standard of review. 118 A PRP can now sue in a civil action in which the tribunal is a federal district court under a
"preponderance of the evidence" standard for non-liability. 119
Certainly, a civil action yields a more even playing field than
an EPA administrative proceeding.
Moreover, the EPA never asserted to the court that Wagner was liable for the release in question, and no other owner
operator existed from whom to seek contribution. 120 The least
that the Wagner III court should have done was to send Wagner back to arbitration under the old rule to seek its remedy. If
Wagner could not fit under the new rule, the EPA could at
least be estopped from saying that Wagner could not fit under
the pre-existing one.
The court claimed that the issue was not liability, but
rather the definition of one who "receives and complies" with

116.
Courts and agencies with roles include the Federal Judiciary and the
Department of Justice as well as the Department of Defense, CERCLA §§ 106(a),
120, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9620 (1988). See also Executive Order No. 12580, §§
2(a), 2(c), 2(d), 5(a), 7(b)(2) and 4(d)(1) (Jan. 25, 1987) (delegating authority to the
Public Health Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and Coast Guard).
See CERCLA §§ 111(a)(2), 112(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 961l(a)(2), 9612(b); c{.id. §
117.
106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2).
118.
See id. § 112(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a)-(b).
Id.; § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2).
119.
120.
Wagner I, BOO F.2d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1986).
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an the EPA order. 121 With this little semantic twist, the court
completely sidestepped the real issue of whether Wagner was
entitled to a remedy. If Wagner was not liable for cleanup, then
Wagner had paid $2.3 million for which it was not liable, and
any liable party, or EPA which ordered the cleanup, owed restitution to Wagner, a "remedy" to return Wagner to its "rightful
position." 122 Section 112 and section 106, as discussed, each
provided a remedy to Wagner, each in its own procedural way.
The court was arguing the interpretation of semantic nuances as used to define procedures and forgot to do equity for
those who do equity. Wagner, a non-liable PRP, funded an erroneous order and was entitled to a remedy. This court should
have asked whether Wagner was entitled to a remedy, and
whether the court was empowered to grant the remedy. The
court almost acknowledged the real issue when it stated that
"[i]t is fortuitous that this question arises as a potential bar to
recovery by Wagner and, apparently, a few other parties whose
notice and compliance straddled enactment of SARA."123 It
defaulted in its role as a court of equity, merely waving the
wand of "precedent" (of which there was sufficient contrary on
these facts 124) as it mouthed the "due deference" incantations,
arriving at an unjust result.

The Cursory Treatment of EPA's Conflict of Interest Defeated The "Due Process" Relied Upon in Wagner I
C.

The court mentioned that the EPA may have erred in issuing its original order, and might not want to admit it. 125 The
court said that this was "surely too slight a gain, however, for
the court to consider the agency an interested party whose
interpretation is therefore not to be accorded the deference
ordinarily due to the agency with responsibility for administering the law." 126 The court thus dismissed $2.3 million in liability, which would certainly be a faux pas of some significance,
even on a Superfund scale. It would be pure conjecture to estimate how large a claim is required before the EPA becomes a

121.
Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 920.
122.
See Wagner I, 800 F.2d at 316-17; see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN
AMERICAN REMEDIES 14 et. seq. (1985).
123.
Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 922.
124.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
125.
Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 922.
126.
Id.
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party interested in the outcome. However, is it not likewise
conjecture for the court to say that a $2.3 million error, and the
loss of a section 106 liability suit, to a good faith PRP advancing an "act of God" defense was insufficient to bias the
EPA in administering justice?

D. Judicial Estoppel Should Have Precluded the EPA's Assertion in Wagner III that Wagner Had No Remedy
The court stated that "when a statute, viewed in light of its
legislative history and the traditional tools of statutory construction, is ambiguous, then the administering agency is entitled to make reasonable policy choices in deciding how to interpret it," 127 so Wagner had no right to trial de novo on issues
of law. 128 The EPA's decision against reimbursement of Wagner was characterized as a non-retrospective construction of the
law/ 29 with the crux of the dispute being whether Congress
intended the term "receives" to apply retrospectively or prospectively from the date the statute was adopted. 130 It rejected the EPA's claim of "ownership of the plain meaning of the
language." 131 No criticism is due that part of the decision. However, the court still erred by citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Bush, 132 to show the EPA's interpretation to be consistent.
By invoking either the "equitable" or ')udicial" estoppel
theory, one can argue that the EPA had already made an interpretation of the availability of a remedy. In Wagner I its position was that Wagner would suffer no "non-compensable
harm," that Wagner could have judicial review of its claim to
reimbursement after compliance and not before. 133 It knew
that Wagner was using the "act of God" defense and never
found Wagner liable for the cleanup costs. 134 To say later that
the reimbursement remedy was not available, was contrary to
the interpretation of the statute on which the court relied. 135
The EPA and the courts were ignoring the section 112 provi-

127.
!d. at 920 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
128.
!d. at 920-921.
129.
!d. at 922-933.
!d. at 919-920.
130.
Id. at 924.
131.
132.
918 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1990).
Wagner I, 800 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1986).
133.
134.
See id. at 312.
!d. at 316-317.
135.
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sions for remedy under a slightly different procedure. Even if
one is willing to give the EPA credit for a supportable construction of the statute in Wagner III, the EPA contradicts the interpretation it advanced in Wagner I. The error is particularly
egregious when one considers that in Wagner III, the EPA
argued that section 112 remedies were only applicable if a PRP
had "permission" in advance to do a cleanup. 136 What is an
"administrative order" if not permission? Even equitable estoppel would have applied since Wagner relied to its detriment on
the prevailing EPA argument in Wagner I. Wagner decided to
clean up first and apply for reimbursement later. Under judicial estoppel, the mere advancement by the EPA of the argument in Wagner I (that post hoc judicial review of a claim for
reimbursement was Wagner's remedy) was sufficient to estop
the EPA from advancing its position Wagner III of the nonavailability of the reimbursement remedy. 137 Wagner should
have raised this defense, and further, the court should have
raised it sua sponte since the doctrine exists to protect the
integrity of the judicial process. 138

The EPA Policy in Wagner III May
Promote PRP Foot-Dragging

D.

Wagner chose to cooperate, probably to better contain the
cost of cleanup and as a hedge against their "good faith" defense to the EPA's penalties. Mter litigation, Wagner was
worse off than if it had waited until the EPA brought an action
to compel, and then defended against the action. Assessing the
cost of a gamble is difficult with penalties as steep as those
threatened in Wagner I/ 39 but how could Wagner possibly
have been worse off? Litigants similarly situated, not necessarily on section 106 orders like Bethlehem 140 and Wagner
II/, 141 but under similar EPA postures, might use Wagner III
as a precedent to argue that they are resisting "in good faith,"

136.
See Wagner III, 946 F.2d 918, (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the EPA read § 1ll(a)(2)
as requiring advance authorization, but then argued that their order was not an
authorization).
137.
See id. at 921.
138.
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1177 (D. S.C.
1975).
139.
Wagner I, BOO F.2d at 313 (2d Cir. 1986).
140.
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1990)
141.
Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d 918; Wagner II, 709 F. Supp. 249; Wagner I, 800
F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986).
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unable to rely on the assertions of the EPA as to remedies and
future actions. Wagner III stands for recalcitrance rather than
cooperation; reliance on the EPA assurances of "no non-compensable harm" results in "no compensation" for having cooperated too readily.

E.

Summary

In summary, the EPA is not the "administering agency" of
CERCLA. It is a "prosecutor" entitled to no deference for purposes of interpreting section 106(b)(2). It is an agent to screen
claims and payments under section 106(a). Because of Wagner's
poor pleading and the EPA's improper arguments, the court
failed to focus on whether a remedy existed, and whether the
court could provide it. The court focused instead on the ambiguous wording of the section 106(b)(2) reimbursement process.
With "undue deference" 142 to the EPA's inconsistent interpretations, it gave Wagner no remedy even under section 112. By
failing to judicially estop the EPA, the court fell victim to its
own shallow review of the facts in an odyssey between "the
devil and the deep blue sea." Perhaps the EPA will wonder why
PRPs are reluctant to cooperate with and rely upon it.

V.

RECOMMENDATION

The courts still can, and should, look to their ability to do
equity, not abdicating to agencies with incantations of "due
deference" absent "due process." Even with complexity and
ambiguities in statutes, they should not follow precedent from
sister jurisdictions without analyzing for themselves what can
be done in equity. Detailed analyses, like that of Judge
Breyer/ 43 are available, so a court need not lose sight of equity, and consider itself bound, when it is not. Courts have a
duty to "rein in" the EPA actions which over-reach to accomplish Congressional objectives. "Deference" should not get such
high billing that courts stretch until any "process," regardless
of how burdensome and inequitable, is "due process."
PRPs should not sit idly by, bemoaning this state of affairs
in the federal judiciary. They might avoid the Wagner trap by
initiating remedial actions first and reasonably, to meet the

142.
See Wagner Ill, 946 F.2d at 923, 925; cf id. at 925-927 (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
143.
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objectives of the law. If the EPA then goes too far, they can
safely "wait it out," forcing the EPA to bring an action first.
This gives the PRP access to judicial review. PRPs must document their own good-faith actions in the administrative record
to secure the good faith exception if the EPA becomes intransigent.
Moreover, no PRP should wait for the court to fashion a
remedy in equity. It can find the substantive flaws in precedent
which may be subject to attack as overly deferential, illogical,
or not squarely on point with facts. This is hard, but Judge
Breyer and Judge Williams looked beyond misapplied repetitive
rhetoric, to analyze law, fact, and equity. 144
Finally, to assure that the EPA does not affront the dignity
of the judicial process, PRPs should assert the judicial estoppel
defense. This defense might be successfully used to keep the
EPA from "playing fast and loose" with the courts, "arguing out
of both sides of its mouth" as to the operative facts. Even where
courts are less receptive to judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel
is still recognized and an excellent alternative where a PRP
has acted in reliance on an EPA position.
The EPA likewise is not without a duty to deal equitably.
No industrial corporation would commit the public relations
"faux pas" that the EPA made, arguing first that Wagner had a
remedy, and then later that no, that remedy was not available.
If it wants more than "malicious obedience," the EPA must be a
regulatory agency which develops predictable policies followed
by cooperative industries who seek advice, and take it in good
faith.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Wagner Seed Company's warehouse was destroyed by fire
from a lightning strike, an "act of God" under the CERCLA
statute, and a complete defense to liability for the subsequent
chemical spill. Wagner received an administrative order from
the EPA to clean up the site at its own expense or face Draconian penalties. Wagner I held that pre-enforcement judicial
review on the merits of the administrative order was not avail-

144.
See Wagner III, 946 F.2d at 926, 929-930 (Williams, J., dissenting) (EPA
not entitled to "arbitrary and capricious" standard when acting as President's
prosecutor); Ottati & Goss, at 434, 435-436 (EPA not entitled to deference in its
choice of remedy, and SARA does not divest equity jurisdiction from courts in
favor of EPA).

422

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 6

able. Wagner had to comply first and seek post-cleanup reimbursement, subject to judicial review, if it proved to be not
liable. Otherwise Wagner had to risk its existence, due to accumulated penalties over years of non-compliance, on the chance
that a court would find that it relied on the rarely granted "act
of God" defense "in good faith." Unfortunately, Wagner petitioned under the new section 106(b)(2) reimbursement provision rather than under section 112. It found that its defense
was not disputed by the EPA, but the EPA interpreted section
106(b)(2) as not allowing reimbursement to Wagner. Ironically,
it was Wagner's early compliance on which the EPA based its
disqualification of Wagner for the remedy. The interpretation of
"non-availability" of reimbursement was directly contrary to
the EPA's position adopted by the court in Wagner I.
The court which last reviewed this case, in Wagner III,
erred in four ways. First, the court erred by designating the
EPA as the "administrating agency" for CERCLA with no supporting language in the statute. Second, the court focused on
the procedure of section 106(b)(2) instead of on the issue of
whether a remedy was available at all, such as under section
112. Third, the court gave undue deference to the EPA's interpretation of the statute. Fourth, the court failed to estop the
EPA, judicially or equitably, from changing its position on the
availability of reimbursement. The court probably let its equitable processes be abused. The analysis of the court was lengthy
but deferred excessively to the EPA. The ruling robbed Wagner
of the "due process" which the Wagner I court and the EPA had
assured Wagner it could have after compliance. This inequitable result, produced by the EPA's playing "fast and loose" with
the courts, seems to say that any process at all, no matter how
late and regardless of equity is somehow "due process." Such a
travesty is probably a tragedy for all.

Jack Pate

